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The paper is concerned with an approach to solutions of bargaining problems, i.e. 
with a rule by which participants of a nonantagonistic game select from the set of all 
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the selection in a concrete game is specified by the class chosen for consideration. Some 
partial ordering, associated with "contributions of the participants to the gamen, is given 
on every class of games, and only monotonic in respect to this ordering solutions are con- 
sidered. To choose from these solutions a single one it is offered to require the maximum 
incentive of the participant with the maximum "value of his contribution " but within the 
limits of monotonicity. The paper contains concrete examples. 
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1 . INTRODUCTION 
The present paper deals with solutions of bargaining 
problems, that is, rules by which an arbitrator or participants of 
a nonantogonistic game select from the set of all feasible 
outcomes (or payoffs) some "fairM outcome, which is normally a 
result of a compromise. 
The approach to this problem was first taken in the basic 
paper Nash [61. At present in the literature much attention is 
devoted to this branch of game theory. The survey of many results 
and a bibliografy are contained e.g. in Roth [ 9 ] .  
The approach which we treat here bases on the following. At 
first we consider a rather diverse class of games. In particular, 
this class may be "not too broadn. Herewith the selection in a 
concrete game is specified by the class chosen for consideration, 
and extending or narrowing the class one may come to a new rule of 
the selection. (Into each class taken separetly the independence 
of irrelevant alternatives holds under our axioms). 
Secondly (and it seems to be the most essential 
circumstance) some partial ordering is given on every class of 
games, and we imply that this ordering is assosiated with 
"contributions of the participants into the gametq (see below for 
examples). The chosen solution depends on the ordering and, in 
particular, is monotonic in respect to it. 
Monotonic in similiar sense solutions have been investigated 
before (see, for example, proportional solutions in Isbell [I I, 
Kalai [21, Myerson [31, Roth [91), but from quite different 
standpoints. We have noted, that the classes of games considered 
in the paper might be rather narrow. This firstly ensures, that 
there is no conflict between the requirement of monotonocity and 
other natural requirements ( e.g. Pareto optimality). Secondly 
this allows to take account of some prior information about the 
"interrelationships between the participantst9 (see below for 
details ) . 
Under our preliminary axioms an admissable monotonic solution 
is not unique, and the problem arises to choose a single one. 
Being another specific feature of our approach, the rule of such 
choice requires the maximum incentive (or stimulation) of the 
participant with the maximum "value of his contributionH but 
within the limits of postulated axioms, in particular, within the 
limits of monotonocity condition. The latter leads to 
nontriviality of the solution. 
In order to elucidate all this we consider the following 
simple two-person game. 
The Income AZZocatton probZem. Let two participants take 
part in a business, and we are able to measure their 
llcontributions@l into it. The contributions (as well as the 
participants) can be understood in a very broad sense. For example 
the contributions may be levels of investments of real individuals 
or influence characteristics of some factors in a production 
process (e.g. the labour productivity, the capital etc). 
Let number si be the value of a contribution (or simply a 
contribution) of the i-th participant, s=(sl ,s2) and R(s) (a 
"production function") be the global income for the vector of 
contributions s. We are interested to h o w  what parts of the 
income must be put down to every participant. 
Let gi be a share of the i-th participant. It is clear 
that in a general case these shares have to depend on the 
vector of contributions, i. e . gi=gi (s ) . Thus 
gl (s) + g2(s) = R(s). 
The problem consists in the choice of a vector function 
g=(gl,g2). Each game is assosiated with a vector s, and the class 
of games may be identified with the set S={s:s120, s22 0 1 .  For 
any s we have the set of feasible outcomes 
A(s)= { v=(vl ,vl ) : v,+v2=R(s) 1 
It is convenient to elucidate some results of the paper by 
this model. Assume R(sl , s2 ) be symmetric and nondecreasing in 
every argument. Then it is natural to assume that 
gi(a,a)=R(a,a)/2 (0.1 
(the case of equal contributions ) , and gi (sl , s2 ) does not 
decrease at least in si. We call this property (may be in a too 
high flown manner for such a simple model) the Incentive (or 
Stimulation) property. 
In many situations it is natural also to think that the 
income of any participant must not decline as the contribution of 
the other one rises, so to say "the rich player must not overwhelm 
the poor one". In other words, we require that gi(sl,s2) does not 
decrease in s j # i. In this case we shall speak about the j' 
Nondiminution (or Nonpressing) property. 
Alongside with the incentive property this only means that 
g(s) does not decrease in respect to the standard partial vector 
ordering 3 on S. We oall this property Monotonocity one. 
Now we accept the principle requiring to give the maximum 
share of the income to the participant with the maximum 
contribution but only within the limits of monotonocity and (0.1 ) .  
Strictly speaking it means the following. 
Let G be the class of all monotonic and satisfying (0.1) 
vector functions on S. We choose as the solution such the function 
* * * 
g =(g ,, g2 ) that (0.1) holds, and as sl 3 s2 
* 
g ,(4 = SUP gl(s). (0.2 
g E G  
* (The case s1<s2 is treated analogously.) If we prove that g 
itself belongs to ( it is true, though not quite obvious), 
then (0.2) may be considered as a natural Mclaimantu to be the 
solution. We call (0.2) MI( Maximum Incentive)-solution. 
This model was investigated in detail in Rotarq and Smirnov 
[8], where the concrete MI-solution was obtained (see also sec. 
3). A similiar approach was used in Katyshev and Rotarq[4], 
concerning a mutual insurance model. In both these cases the 
concrete forms of MI-solutions turned out to be not quite trivial. 
The results from [81 and [41 may serve as examples of applying 
general results from Rotarq[7], where the notion of MI-solution 
was defined. The existence of MI-solution was proved in [7 1 for 
two-person games, and the multidimensoinal case was treated under 
burdensome conditions. They were essentially facilitated in 
Kalashnikov and Rotarq [31. 
This paper is mainly devoted to generalization of results 
from [31. The assertions given below seem to have a rather 
completed form. To treat three-person games we shall need also 
some improvement and generalization of the two-person result. In 
our view this generalization is interesting in itself too. We 
also shall give a very brief review of some other results on the 
subject under discussion. 
In Sec.1 the general framework is described; Sec. 2 deals 
with two-person games. In order to illustrate results of Sec.2 we 
formulate in Sec.3 some assertions concerning the income 
allocation problem . Sec. 4-6 are devoted to three-person games. 
To avoid cumbersome formulas we shall not consider games with more 
participants. The translation of three person scheme to the 
k-person case does not meet essential difficulties. 
1 .THE BASIC FFLUEWORK 
Henceforward S={s) be a class of n-person games of arbitrary 
nature, and for every game s a set of all outcomes A(s) c R: is 
given. Note that the same set of outcomes may be assosiated with 
different games, as it takes place, for example, in the income 
allocation problem. We denote points from A (s ) by v= (v, , . . . ,v ) . 
n 
Set V= U A(s). 
s S 
Let a partial ordering t be given on S. 
Assume also that for every game "the rule of priorityw is 
known, namely a breakdown of class S into subclasses S IS 
P 
specified, where p = (pl, ...,pn) is one of permutations of 
(1 , . . . ,n) . We imply that, if s E S then the "contribution into P' 
the game sw of the participant with number p, is not less then 
that with number p2 and so on. Let 
s 0 = n c  
P P' 
The solution for the class S is such a map h:S+V, that 
h(s) E A(s) for all s E S. 
We shall also write h (s )= (hl (s ) , . . . ,% (s ) ) , implying that hi (s ) 
is an inoome (or utility) of the i-th participant. 
Let as before be the usual vector ordering in R", and 
n(A) be the set of all Pareto optimal points from A in respect to 
. (In particular, n(A) 5 A) .Set n(s) = n(A(s)). 
Let ')t be the class of all solutions with the following 
properties . 
Property 1: Pareto optimality: h(s) E n(s) for all s E S. 
P r ~ p e r t y  2: Monotonocity: If s' t s, then h(sV) 2 h(s). 
PMperty 3: Priority: If s E Sp, then 
In particular, if s E So, then 
Of course class 7i may be empty or may contain more than one 
element. 
- 2 0 1 .  The map Let D = { v : v,= ...  vn 
K(S) = II(S) n D. 
may be the simplest example of a solution from H. (To be sure one 
can consider E, if the right side of (1.1 ) is not empty. It is 
obvious that E posesses properties 1,3 and, as is shown in Sec.4, 
under rather mild conditions posesses property 2.) We call an 
evening out solution. It is too primitive and, as a rule, cannot 
be satisfactory. Below we consider the solution opposed in some 
sense to h. 
2. THE TWO-PLAYER CASE 
Let n=2. 
* * Definltlon 1. The map h is called MI-solution, if h E 31, 
and for every p and all s E S 
P 
* h (s)= sup h (2.1 j 
hE3C 
* In our view the solution h seems to be natural in many 
instances. On the other hand we should note that the choice of 
such a solution would be the reflection of a logical but extreme 
position. The solutions and h* are the extreme ones, and 
ensuring, for example, "social stabilityn or a more favorable 
 psychological atmosphere" in the game we may come to the adoption 
* 
of a solution intermediate between and h . The choice of this 
intermediate solution must apparently be based on the special 
features of a particular case. Our aim is to state the bounds on 
this choice. 
Before the following proposition it is appropriate to note, 
that the existense of MI-solution is not quite obvious, because it 
is not quite obvious that the map defined in (2 .I ) belongs to 31. 
Condition A. For all s E S the set n(s) is compact. 
Theorem 1. Let condition A hold, and class 7i be not empty. 
Then MI-solution exists and is unique. 
We slightly generalize this assertion. Let Z:S+R' and 7iZ be 
the class of all solutions h E ?( and such that hi(s) < z (s) for 
i=1,2. One may interpreted z as a maximum "allowed incomew. 
We call the map h*' MI-solution in respect to 7iZ, if h *Z E 7iZ, 
and for every p and all s E S P 
h*' ( 5 )  = sup 
p1 h E nZ 
Theorem 1 ' . Let oondition A hold, and 7 f z  be not empty. Then 
MI-solution in respect to 7-l' exists and is unique. 
Proof of theorem 1'. It suffices to consider classSq2 . 
Since 3~' is not empty, the set 
Q(s)= C v: v = h(s) for some h E 31'1 
is not empty either (we omit the upper index z for simplicity). By 
property 1 Q(s) E fl(s) . Let 0 be the closure of Q. By condition A 
- 
Q(s) E II(s). 
- 
(2 -2 )
Let h*(s) be the point from Q(s) with the maximum first 
coordinate. Since n(s) is bounded, (2.2) causes the existence of 
such a point. It is unique because of Pareto-optimality of points 
from fl(s). Finally (2.2) implies that h*(s) E II(s) s A(s). 
We shall prove that h* E R". If s E SI2, then v1 N2 for all v 
* * 
E Q (s ) . Consequently hl (s ) 2 h2 (s ) , and property 3 holds. From 
(2.2) property 1 also follows. It is also obvious that h: (s) 6 
* 
z ( s )  for all s. Thus it remains to prove monotonocity of map h in 
respect to t on SI2. 
Let s' t s. Assume that 
$(st) < h:(s). 
By construction for all h E 3C 
~ ( 5 )  2 $(s), (2.3) 
because otherwise point h(s) would not be Pareto optimal. 
For any &>O there exists such h" E 7( that 
* * 
Setting E = ( % ( B )  - h2(s9))/2 and using (2.3) we get 
$(st) 6 [%(s) + $(s9)]/2 < h:(s) < $(s) 
It is not possible, because hE E 7(. Analogously one can prove 
* 
monotonocity of hl. The theorem is proved. 
Theorem 1 essentially generalizes the corresponding theorem 
from [7], though the proofs are similiar. 
We should also compare our axioms with some well known ones. 
The question has been disscussed in [71, and so we shall only note 
the following. Assume for simplicity that 
s'ks = A(s) S A(s' ) (2.4) 
It is a natural assumption; in Sec.4-6 we shall use it. It is 
easy to see that monotonocity together with (2.4) and Pareto 
optimality implies the independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
The reverse is not generally true, and, in particular, the Nash 
solution may be not monotonic (an example see e.g. in [71). 
As to the independence of equivalent utility representations, 
this property may be redundant for our scheme, because S may not 
contain sets derived from one to another by a linear 
transformation. But even in the opposite case one may construct 
the class for which there is no solution possessing the latter 
property and properties 1 t h r o w  3. Therefore we need another 
rule to distinguish the unique solution in N. 
Now let us turn to the proportional solutions. We shall 
follow Roth [91, where, in particular, class M of all games with 
freely disposable utility is considered (one can see the accurate 
definition in Sec.4). and a number of axioms is discussed: 
independence of common scale changes, strong individual 
rationality and decomposability. The latter property seems to be 
the most important. 
It was shown that the fullfillment of these axioms implies 
monotonocity, and , as is proved in Kallai [2], if these axioms 
are fullfilled on M, then a solution may be only proportional, 
i.e. the result of the selection is the point of the intersection 
of a ray starting from the origin with the boundary of the set of 
outcomes. In other words we deal with a solution similiar to E. 
Such solution cannot be satisfactory in cases which we 
discuss here. On the other hand the opportunity to restrict 
ourselves to a narrow class of games allows to choose a more 
* 
resoursefull solution, for example h . 
It should be noted that the above reasoning should not be 
taken as a criticism of Nash or other schemes. Our aim is only to 
discuss some differences and to emphasize that one of the basic 
differences is that we each time choose a rather diverse and maybe 
narrow class of games which is also partially ordered. 
We already have noted that MI-solution in a conorete problem 
might be not trivial. To illustrate this, we discuss some results 
from [81 concerning 
3. MI-SOLUTION IN THE INCOME ALLOCATION P R O B W  
For simplicity we sligtly change the denotations of the 
Introduction. Henceforward we shall write x in place of s, and y 
in place of set Set u(x,y) = gl (x,y). Since 
g2(x,y) = R(x,y) - u(x,y), (3.1 ) 
it suffices to deal with function u. Let R(x,y) be a symmetric, 
nondecreasing in all arguments and twice differentiable function. 
* * 
It was shown in [81, that in this case the functions gl,g2 are 
smooth. Hence in view of (3.1) and the properties 1-3 we must 
consider on the set B={(x,y): xby 1 such functions u(x,y), that 
u(x,x)=R(x,x)/~, (3-2) 
0 < %..&~l ( R, (x, Y) : = !?E~x&z~ , (3.3) Bx 
Thus MI-solution is the function 
* 
u (x,Y) = SUP u(x,y). ( 3 . 5 )  
U E U  
where U is the class of all functions defined on B and satisfying 
"boundary" condition (3.2) and conditions on the derivatives 
(3.3),(3.4). The problem of seeking for this function seems to be 
interesting in pure mathematical sense too. Firstly we elucidate 
the following. 
Let x>y. Together with the point z=(x,y) we consider the 
points z=(y,y) - and z=(x,x). Let us transit from the point z - to the 
point z ( the first participant increases his contribution and the 
second one does not do it). It might seem that MI-solution 
requires to give the whole arising increment of the income to the 
first player, that is to choose the solution (see also Fig.1) 
u+(x,Y) := R(x,y) - R(y,y)/2 
(the symbolism will be clear later). Solution ut may be, however, 
nonmonotonic. Really, let us transit now from z to z ( the second 
player increases his contribution up to the value of the first 
player's contribution). The payoff of the first player must become 
equal to the right side of (3.2), but it may turn out that ~'(x,~) 
> u(x,x), i.e.. ut does not belong to U. Thus for the veotor of 
contributions (x,y) the first player's income must not exceed 
uW(x,y) := R(x,x)/2.  
It is obvious now that (see also Fig.1) 
* N + 
u (x,y) < u(x,y) := min C u (x,y), u-(x,y)). (3.6) 
It follows from (3.6), that, if satisfies (3.3)-(3.4), then it 
is MI-solution. However we shall see that it is not always true. 
* N 
Firstly we consider the case when really u = u. At the 
start let 
R(x,y) = R(x+y). (3 .7 )  
It is easy to calculate that in this case the following 
holds. If for all t>O the function R(t) is concave from below, 
+ (R"(t)W for all t) then ut 6 u-, the function u satisfies 
* + (3.3),(3.4) and u = u . If R(t) is concave from above (Rf'(t)60 
- * - 
for all t), then u+ 2 u and u = u . 
We turn to the general case. Let 
We assume also that L is continious and decreasing curve in B, 
i.e. one can write that L={ (x,y): x2y, y = q(x)I, where (Q is a 
continious and decreasing function. 
2 Let RI2(x,y)= 8 R(x,y)/bxay, the curve 
M = { z E B: RI2(z)=O I, 
and, as above, M = {(x,y)~B: y = $(x)), where $ is also 
cont inious and decreasing. 
Let $-I , (pl be the corresponding inverse functions. Set 
(see also Pig.2), and 
Proposition 1. Let R12(z) > 0 , if z E MI; and RI2(z) < 0, 
* if z E M Then u = u. 2 
We consider now an opposite in some sense case, when 
N 
MI-solution does not coincide with u. Let xo be a solution of the 
equation x - q ( x ) .  It is not difficulte to calculate that this 
solution is unique and (xO,xO) E M. 
Proposition 2. Let R12(z) < 0 , if z E MI; and R12(z) > 0, if 
z E M2. Then 
* 
u (x,y) = uV(x,y), if x C xo; and 
If (x,y) E M, then 
where we integrate along the curve M. 
* * 
If x C x C ' y , then u (x,y) = u (x, Q(x) ) ;  
* 
and if xo y 2 +(XI, then u (x.y) = R(x,y) - u*($-' (y) ,y). 
Note that in the both cases (proposition 1 and proposition 2 ) 
the solution is the result of the corresponding integration of the 
function R, (a, b) . The ways of integration are shown in Fig.2 and 
in Fig.3 correspondingly. In the first case the curve L play the 
role of a "separating curveu, in the second case the curve M play 
the role of a turnpyke. 
We illustrate propositions 1 and 2 by the particular case 
(3.7). Let for some xo > 0 the second derivative R"(t) < 0 if t < 
2xo, RU(t)= 0 if t=2x0, and RU(t) > 0 if t < xo. Then 
L = {  Z E B :  x+y=2xO}, 
* 
and, as is easy to calculate,in this oase MI-solution u 
takes the following values: 
R(2x)/2 if x < xo. R(x+y) - R(2y)/2 if y > xo ; 
(1/2) R(2x0) + R' (ex0) (x - xo) if xo c x c $-'(y) ; 
R(x+y) - (1/2) R(2x0) + R' (2xo)(xo - y) if x02y2~(x). 
* 
We see that u is linear in the third zone and depends 
only on the value of the derivative in point 2x0. 
4. THE THREE-PERSON CASE 
For the present we are not able to translate theorem 1 to the 
k-person oase without supplementary conditions. At any rate a 
literal translation of the proof does not work. We should not 
analyse details and note only the following. If we gave the 
preference to the first player, it would not be obvious that there 
was a monotonic solution, which divides the ltremainder of the 
incomevv between the second and the third players. 
Set A = {A(s);s E S). 
Condl t Ion I. Every set from A is compact . 
Condition I1 Every game from S is a game with freely 
disposable utility, i.e. for all A E A 
A={v: v 6 x for some x E 81 (4.1 ) 
Since we deal with Pareto optimal solutions, this condition, 
in fact, does not restrict generality. 
The following condition slightly narrows the class of games 
under discussion and concerns the part of the boundary of A, 
which lies outside the coordinate planes. 
k k Namely let us consider a space R+, where k is arbitrary. Let R,o 
{v:vi > 0 ,  i = l ,  ..., k}, be the closure of set A, and a(A) be the 
boundary of A. We define the set-to-set map K by the following: 
k WA) = U(A) n R,,. (4.2) 
Now we return to class A and set K(s) = K(A(s)). 
Condltlon 111. For all s E S 
K(s) = n(s) # 0 
Condition A is fullf illed under conditions I, I11 of course. 
At last we consider 
Condltlon IV. If s'ts, then A(s' ) 2 A(s). 
Theorem 2. If conditions I - through IV ape - fullfilled, - then 
the class ?f is not empty, in particular, 7( s h where h is the same 
as in (1.1). 
Proof is very simple. Firstly we show that the intersection 
in (1.1) is not empty. Let A E A. Since K(A) is not empty, A 
3 contains points from q0 and, by condition 11, points from D with 
positive coordinates. Since A is bounded, there is a point d E D 
coordinates of which are equal to sup{vl: v~AflD,v,>O}. 
By (4.3), d E n(A) 'I A, and the intersection in (1 .I ) is not 
empty. 
It is obvious that map possesses properties 1 ,3. Let s' t 
s. By construction either h(s) < h(s'), or h(s)>h(st). The latter 
is impossible since by condition IV and Pareto optimality of 
solution E. The proof is complete. 
Now we turn to MI-solutions. Let ?fi(z)= {h E ?f : hi=z}, where 
1 a map z :  S+R . This class may be empty of course. 
Definition 2. The map h* is called MI-solution, if h* E 7 ( ,  
and for every p and all s E S P 
We shall need one more condition on sets from A. This 
condition seems not too burdensome, but anyway it is 
For any set A by [Pi(A;a) we denote the projection of the 




For sets A,B from a space R:, we shall write A 3 B, if A 2 
B, and K (A) n K(B) = 0. 
Condition V. For all A,A'E A and numbers x,y>O either 
* 
'J'i(A;x) 2 'J'i(Af ;Y), 
or' 
or 
Pi(A;x) = Pi(A' ;y) . 
Let, for example, as in the income allocation problem, for 
3 any s E S the set A(s)= {v E R,: vl +v2+vj< R(s)}, where R ( s )  is a 
function. Then condition V is fullf illed. 
Theorem 3. Let conditions I through V be fullfilled. Then 
MI-solution exists and is unique. 
We assume henceforward that conditions I through V hold. 
Lema 1 .  Let A E A ; i=1,2,3; y ) x > 0; and the sets Pi(A;x), 
Pi(A;y) are not empty. Then 
and Pi(A;x) iff 
The proof is simple and we leave it out. 
Lemma 2. Let h E X; i = ~  ,2,3; sf k s; and A=A(s), 
Af=A(s' ).  Then 
Pi(A;hi(s)) s Pi(A';hi(st ) )  (5.2) 
Proof. Let, for example, (5.2) does not hold for i=l . Then, 
by condition V 
and the same holds under replacement s by s' . ( Here the set-to-set 
map K ( . )  is considered on R:). In view of (5.3) and property 1 the 
latter means that either h h s or h3 (s)>h3 (s' 1, which 
contradicts to the proposition that h E E. The lemma is proved. 
For all sets A,B we define 
Lemma 3. Let A E A, and a number x be an interior point of 
the projection A on the first coordinate axis. Then the function 
PI (K (PI (A:x+E) .K (B1 (A;x) ) ) (5.4) 
is continious in E .  
Proof.  Let x' be the supremum of all points x described 
above. The set A is bounded, and all Pareto optimal points are 
limits of sequences of points from {K (PI (A;x) ) , x<xl 1 .  Therefore 
for all x<x' sets LK (PI (A;x)) are not empty. The set K(P1 (A;x' ) )  
is not empty either, because otherwise condition I11 would not 
hold. The latter set contains only one point, namely the origin, 
because otherwise one would be able to show such a sequence of 
points from sets {K (PI (A;x) ) ,  X<X' 3 ,  that the limit of this 
sequence would not be Pareto optimal. 
It follows from the above reasoning, that if xtx', then the 
intersection K (PI (A;x) ) with the line { (v2 ,v3 ) : v2=v3tg cp}, 
where 0 < cp ,< 76/2, contains one and only one point. We denote it 
The Pareto optimal and bounded surface K (A) is continious. 
3 Therefore i n  R+ points  
The s e t  
Cx = u l ( x , v )  c K ( A ) = n ( A ) ,  (P 
since a l l  points  from Cx a re  l i m i t s  of points  from the bounded 
s e t  K ( A ) .  Then 
c, = K ( p l  (A;x)) ,  
s ince otherwise condition I11 would not hold. Therefore 
(5.4) is  equal t o  pl ( K ( p l  (A;x+€)),C,). 
It remains t o  note tha t  the convergence i n  (5.5)  is uniform 
i n  cp f o r  the simple reason tha t  a function,  continious on a 
compact, is uniformly continious. The proof is complete. 
Set  
* h, ( s )  = sup h, ( s )  (5 .6)  
h E 3 C  . 
* Lemma 4. Let s ' ts ,  A = A ( s ) ,  A ' = A ( s ' ) ,  B = P 1 ( A ; h , ( s ) ) ,  
* B' = PI ( A '  ;hl (s' ) ) . Then 
Proof. Assume tha t  (5.7) does not hold. Then, by condition V ,  
B 2 ,  B ' ,  (5.8) 
N N N N 
and B' fl B = 0 , where B=O( ( B ) ,  B' (B'  ). 
N N 
Hence, s ince  the s e t s  B, B' a r e  closed, there  is such 8>0,  
tha t  
By (5.6) f o r  every E>O the re  e x i e t s  such hE E # t ha t  
E N Set  Bk = PI (A'  ;hl (s  ) ) , BE= IK (Bk)  . By lemma 3 and (5 . l o )  there 
is such & t ha t  
Now i t  is not d i f f i c u l t  t o  r e a l i s e  tha t  (5.11 ) , ( 5 . 9 )  and (5.8)  
imply the r e l a t i o n  
By construct ion and lemma 1 
E B s PI (A;hl (s)  ) .  
From (5.12) '  (5.13) we obtain tha t  
PI (A';hT(s 1 )  c P ( A ; ~ ~ ( s ) ) ,  
which contradic ts  t o  lemma 2. Lemma 4 is proved. 
6. PROOF OF THEOREM 3 
It su f f i ce s  t o  consider the c l a s s  of games S1=S123 U s1 32 BY 
* 
theorem 2 the c l a s s  7i is not empty. Let hl (s)  be the  same a s  in 
(5 .6 ) .  Following the log ic  of the proof of theorem 1 '  , i t  is easy 
* 
t o  prove tha t  the map hl (s)  is monotonic in  respect  t o  t . Let now 
* 
B ( s )  = PI (A(s);hl  (8)  1 -  
By analogy with the beginning of the proof of theorem 1 ,  one 
e a s i l y  proves tha t  f o r  s e t s  { B ( s ) ,  SES) the "two dimensional" 
var ian t s  of conditions I,II,III a r e  f u l f i l l e d .  By lemma 4, i f  s ' k  
S,  then 
B ( s )  E B ( s ' ) ,  
i . e  condition I V  is a l so  f u l f i l l e d .  
* 
Set  S23 = S123, Sg2 = S132 , and z(6)=hl  (s) .  
We define c l a s s  zZ as in Sec. 2 in respect  t o  the 
two-person problem, spec i f ied  by c l a s s  S1, the point-to-set 
mapping B (s) , ordering k on S1 , and subclasses S23v 
'32 
It is c l e a r  (see  a l s o  theorem 2 )  tha t  c l a s s  31' is not 
empty. Then by theorm 1' there e x i s t s  MI-solution 
- 2G - 
* * * * 
Set h = (h,, h2, h ) .  It is obvious that the latter map is 3 
the one which we seek for. The theorem is proved. 
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